The Supreme Court of Virginia Reverses and Remands a Significant Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Case
Cridler-Smith v. Clarke, Record No. 230450 (Va. Jan. 16, 2025)
John Cridler-Smith was charged with possession with intent to distribute more than five pounds of marijuana after law enforcement intercepted packages with the marijuana mailed from California to his brother’s Virginia residence. After his arrest, Cridler-Smith told his counsel that he had two main goals: to protect his brother and to get out of jail quickly. On counsel’s advice, he agreed to cooperate with law enforcement and made incriminating statements to a detective, including admitting to shipping nine pounds of marijuana to his brother’s house. He told the detective that his brother was uninvolved with the crime. While the cooperation secured his release, the Commonwealth ultimately proceeded to trial, where his confession formed the centerpiece of the prosecution’s case. His counsel never moved to suppress the confession or objected to its admission. Cridler-Smith was convicted.
He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel due to (1) his counsel’s advice to cooperate with law enforcement despite inadequate investigation into the case, and (2) his counsel’s failure to later move to suppress the incriminating statements he made while cooperating. The trial court dismissed the petition and Cridler-Smith appealed.
The Supreme Court found that counsel’s advice to cooperate with law enforcement was not constitutionally deficient because it reasonably advanced Cridler-Smith’s stated objectives and further investigation would not have aided those goals.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court found that counsel’s failure to move to suppress, or even object to, the admission of the statements was constitutionally deficient. Cridler-Smith argued that his confession was inadmissible under Rule 3A:8(c)(6), which prohibits the use of statements “made in connection with and relevant to” an offer to plea. Here, however, the factual question remained as to whether Cridler-Smith’s statements were made in the context of a plea negotiation between him and the Commonwealth. So, the Court remands to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing and determination of whether the confession fell within the scope of the Rule.
Though it was not certain that the argument would have succeeded, however, the court emphasized that when counsel has a potentially winning argument that carries no strategic downside, failing to raise it is unreasonable. This is especially true when the result would be the exclusion of confession evidence, which the Court called “like no other evidence” in its power to secure a conviction. Further, since the confession was essential to securing a conviction, even the Director agreed that if the confession fell within the ambit of Rule 3A:8(c)(6), prejudice from the deficient performance would be established.
The case now returns to the circuit court to determine whether Cridler-Smith’s statements were made in connection with plea discussions. If so, he will likely be entitled to habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel.