Supreme Court of Virginia Weighs in on Interpretation of Virginia Code § 19.2-306.1 Governing Probation Violations
Commonwealth v. Castillo Canales, Record No. 230829 / Castillo Canales v. Commonwealth, Record No. 230934 (Va. Apr. 10, 2025)
Silfredo Castillo Canales was convicted of statutory burglary and grand larceny in 2017. He received a five-year sentence for each conviction, running concurrently, with 2.5 years suspended. He began supervised probation upon release in 2019. In October 2021, his probation officer filed a major violation report documenting multiple violations over a five-month period, including: failed drug screens, missed appointments with his probation officer, missed appointments for scheduled drug screens, failed compliance with his drug treatment program, and new criminal charges. These violations were interspersed with periods of compliance where Castillo Canales successfully met probation requirements.
The circuit court decided to address each violation in a separate hearing rather than addressing all violations in a single hearing. Castillo Canales objected, arguing that all violations constituted a “single course of conduct” under Code § 19.2-306.1, and should therefore be considered together. The court disagreed and held multiple hearings in March and May 2022, finding Castillo Canales had violated probation by (1) failing drug screens, (2) failing to appear for drug screens, and (3) failing to attend one probation officer appointment. For the March hearing violations, the court revoked but fully resuspended his sentences. For the May hearing violations, the court ordered a total of 42 days of active incarceration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part that ruling, finding that the trial court could hold separate hearings, but that his violations constituted only two “courses of conduct:” the first being failed drug screens and the second being missed appointments. As a result, it found that Castillo Canales could only be sentenced to a maximum of 14 days’ incarceration total, not per violation, since Code § 19.2-306.1 limits penalties for second technical violations. Both Castillo Canales and the Commonwealth appealed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment regarding the March hearings (where no active incarceration was imposed) but reversed regarding the May hearings, reinstating the trial court’s judgment imposing 42 days of active incarceration (rather than limiting it to 14 days as the Court of Appeals had ruled). It held first that Code § 19.2-306.1 does not require a court to address all probation violations in a single hearing. Courts have broad discretion in managing revocation proceedings. Second, it defined a “single course of conduct” under the statute refers to an “uninterrupted and unbroken series of actions” connected by time, place, and circumstances. Here, the trial court correctly determined that Castillo Canales’ violations were separate and distinct events, rather than a single court of conduct, because the violations occurred over five months, they were separated by periods of compliance, the time between violations ranged from six days to over two months, and the evidence suggested that the violations resulted from separate, calculated decisions.