In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals addresses whether Code § 8.01-249(6) permits a delayed action for childhood sexual abuse
Doe v. Green, Record No. 1450-22-4 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2024)
Facts. Jane Doe alleged that she was sexually abused by Joseph Robert Green in 2005 and 2006 while she was 14 and 15 years old and he was 33 years old. As a result, she suffered from eating and exercise disorders, low self-esteem, suicidal ideation, and emotional disturbances, among other psychological struggles. In 2009, Doe reported Green to the police. He was charged with carnal knowledge of a child but was ultimately acquitted.
In May 2021, Doe’s psychologist diagnosed her with PTSD for the first time. The 2021 version of Code § 8.01-249(6) (“accrual statute”) states that a minor’s claim for sexual abuse accrues on the date that a psychologist “first communicates” to them “the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse.” So, in September 2021, Doe sued Green for negligence, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, arguing that the 2021 accrual statute extended the date of accrual of her claim to May 2021, when she was diagnosed with PTSD.
Green filed a plea in bar asserting that the statute of limitations barred Doe’s claims. He contended that the statute expired in December 2010, two years after Doe turned 18 years old. Green argued that Doe’s claims were governed by the 2005 version of the accrual statute, which only allows a delayed accrual date if the minor also did not know of the “fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse” before reaching 18 years old.
Doe countered that the 2021 accrual statute was retroactive, and that even if it was not, the “fact” of her injury was not “known” to her until her diagnosis. The trial court disagreed with Doe on both counts and granted Green’s plea. Doe appealed.
Issues. (1) Whether the 2021 version of the accrual statute is retroactive. (2) Whether Doe’s claims are time-barred under the 2005 version of the accrual statute.
Holdings. (1) No. That statute contains no explicit language conveying an intent to apply the code section retroactively. (2) Yes. Delayed accrual under the 2005 accrual statute only applies when the “fact of the plaintiff’s injury” and “its causal connection to the sexual abuse” is not “known” by the plaintiff before they reach the age of majority, and Doe’s complaint established that she was aware of her injury before turning 18 years old.
Notes. (1) The 2021 version of the accrual statute delays accrual of a claim for sexual abuse of a minor regardless of the minor’s awareness of the injury or its causal connection to the abuse. If that statute is retroactive, therefore, Doe’s claims could proceed. But a statute is “always construed to operate prospectively unless a contrary legislative intent is manifest.” Here, the 2021 accrual statute has no language that manifests any intent that it apply retroactively. If anything, the statute’s statement that a cause of action “shall be deemed to accrue” on a certain date conveys an intention to enable future claims, not past ones. The Court also rejects Doe’s argument that a 1995 amendment to Article IV § 14 of the Virginia Constitution makes all accrual statutes applicable to childhood sexual abuse claims retroactive. Rather, that amendment permits, not requires, the legislature to retroactively change statutes of limitations.
(2) The 2005 version of the accrual statute only delays accrual of a claim of childhood sexual abuse if the plaintiff was unaware of both the existence and the cause of injury before turning 18 years old. Here, in her complaint, Doe alleged several symptoms that manifested before she turned 18 year old, including a drop in self-esteem, suicidal ideation, and problems with her parents. Most importantly, however, she alleged that she suffered “anxiety about the inappropriate nature of the sexual abuse.” These allegations show that Doe was aware of the cause of her psychological problems. The Court also rejects Doe’s argument that she could not have known of her injury until he was formally diagnosed with PTSD. The word “injury” in the 2005 accrual statute must be construed to include symptoms, not just a diagnosis.